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This article studies a novel factor relevant for the moderation of an Islamist
party: the degree of dependency on a social movement organization. This
question is examined in a case study analysing the evolution of the
relationship between the Moroccan Islamist party, Party of Justice and
Development (PJD), and its founding social movement organization. Over
time, the PJD has been gaining autonomy, becoming more moderate and
simultaneously gaining strength. Contemporaneously, liberalization in
Morocco has been partially reversed, partly as a result of the rising Islamist
strength. These findings suggest that it is the strength of the Islamist
opposition, rather than its ideological rigidity, that makes MENA rulers
reluctant to liberalize. We study the implications of these findings for
European Union policy towards Islamist parties in the MENA region.
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Introduction
The literature on democratic transitions has frequently argued that the moderation
of oppositional actors is an important requisite for successful democratization pro-
cesses. According to this literature, moderation is required to defuse the ‘fear of
the masses’ of incumbent elites. This argument has been subsequently put into
question by showing important, successful transitions where the opposition was
far from moderate, such as in Portugal.1
In scholarship on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the moderation
of the Islamist opposition has recently received considerable attention.2 As a
leading scholar writes, Islamist moderation has emerged as ‘the issue at stake in
debates on Islamist political participation’.3 This literature focuses on whether
the inclusion of Islamist organizations in the formal political processes leads to
their ideological moderation. Moderation is typically defined narrowly as ‘becom-
ing truly committed to democratic practices’.4 Whether moderation is a requisite
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for democratization in the MENA or not is rarely made explicit in this literature,
although it often seems to be assumed implicitly.5 (In the following, we will refer
to this literature as the ‘inclusion-moderation literature’.)
Regardless of whether moderation is actually required for democratization or
not, it appears to be relevant for Western decision-makers. In particular, the timid-
ity of democracy promotion efforts by the European Union (EU), and Western
actors more generally, towards the MENA is frequently attributed to the ideologi-
cal nature of Islamist movements. To the extent that Islamists are not ‘moderate’, it
is believed that pursuing an energetic democracy promotion policy could backfire
by bringing to power actors that would hold illiberal and possibly anti-democratic
and anti-Western positions6 (see Hovdenak’s article on Hamas in this special
issue).
This article studies the moderation of one strand of the Islamist opposition in
Morocco and discusses implications more widely for EU policy toward rulers and
the Islamist opposition in the MENA. In contrast to the inclusion-moderation lit-
erature, we do not focus particularly on Islamist positions towards democratic
practices but define Islamist moderation as an increasing flexibility towards core
ideological beliefs. We consider our definition more appropriate as it does not
presume that Islamists are per se anti-democratic. Like the inclusion-moderation
literature, we study the effect of inclusion on moderation: the constraints
flowing from participation in formal political processes are supposed to promote
bargaining, compromise, and the pursuit of small policy gains, all of which
require that the content of the ideology is negotiable. We focus on a novel
channel of moderation that relates to the interactions between an Islamist party
and an Islamist social movement. We also examine, briefly, the implications of
this moderation for political reform in Morocco.
A relevant, and often overlooked, characteristic of Islamist parties in the
MENA is that, even when founded by an Islamist social movement organization
(ISMO), they are distinct from these organizations. The evolution of a party’s
relationship with an ISMO affects the party’s margin for political moderation.
At least initially, a party depends on an ISMO’s resources for mobilization and
support. Being dependent, a party has to give voice to its founding organization’s
demands and policy stances.7 This is not contentious in the beginning, as both
organizations share similar interests, mainly to increase protection from repression
and to promote the Islamist agenda.8 However, while a party operates in the insti-
tutional arena, an ISMO does not and, therefore, is not subject to those institutional
constraints that apply to political parties such as building coalitions and compro-
mise with other political parties to advance their policy goals. In the hegemonic
authoritarian regimes of the MENA, political parties, moreover, have constantly
to signal loyalty to the regime and acceptance of its legitimacy to rule in order
to avoid repression. As a social movement actor, an ISMO can thus typically
afford to remain more committed to its core agenda. As a result of these different
environments, electoral participation can lead to an increasing gap between the
two actors’ agendas: Over time, the priorities of party leaders and members
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may increasingly be dictated by the logics that rein in the institutional arena and by
loyalty to a party rather than to a social movement organization. In this process, a
party may reform or trade central programmatic points.9 This process, however,
will be limited to the extent that the party maintains a strong dependency on the
movement. Thus, the degree of dependency of a party on its founding organization
is likely to be relevant for its margin for moderation.
Against this background, this article investigates the relationship between the
Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and its founding organization, the Move-
ment of Unity and Reform (MUR) in Morocco. The article covers the period from
1992, when the palace tolerated the integration of the Islamists into a dormant pol-
itical party, up to 2007, when the latest parliamentary elections were held in
Morocco. It focuses especially on the period from 1997–2004, when the emanci-
pation process of the PJD from the MUR took place. The case study in this article
is based on two field research trips, the first in 2003–2004, and the second in
2007.10 It shows that, over that period, the PJD became more independent and
moderate partly by acquiring independent mobilization resources, and also stron-
ger in terms of popular support. The article shows that the Moroccan regime
responded to these developments by deliberalizing, suggesting that the regime
cared more about strength of the Islamic opposition than its level of moderation.
Based on the case study, the last section of the article speculates about policy
implications for actors who want to promote Islamist moderation and political lib-
eralization in the MENA. It focuses on the consequences of providing resources to
Islamist parties, for instance, by giving advice on professional electoral campaign-
ing or, more generally, by publicly considering them as legitimate opposition
actors. The actual policy of the EU towards Islamists in the MENA region is con-
trasted with the lessons extracted from the case study.
The article is organized as follows. The second section studies the growing
autonomy of the PJD from the MUR. The third section analyses the PJD’s mod-
eration process, while the fourth examines the response of the regime to the
increasing strength of the PJD. The fifth discusses the implications of our findings
for EU policy towards Islamist parties, and the sixth section is the conclusion.
The emancipation process of the PJD
The PJD is the offspring of one of the two principal Islamist movement organiz-
ations in Morocco.11 Its inclusion occurred at a moment of political reforms,
among them two constitutional reforms that attributed more power to political
parties and parliament but did not affect the authoritarian nature of the political
regime.
The Islamist organization which gave birth to the PJD emerged from the
Islamic Youth Association, an organization founded around 1970.12 The founder
of the Islamic Youth Association, Abdel Karim Muti’, an inspector of the ministry
of education, was influenced by the radical ideas of the second leader of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Sayyid Qutb.13 Mirroring Qutb’s beliefs about
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Egyptian society, Muti’ consideredMoroccan society to be in a state of pre-Islamic
ignorance against which the use of violence was legitimate to achieve an ‘Islamic
state’. The Islamic Youth recruited its members mostly in universities and in sec-
ondary schools. After the implication of some members in the assassination of
Omar Benjelloun, editor of the socialist party newspaper and prominent Moroccan
Marxist intellectual, in 1975, the organization was banned and officially dissolved
in 1976. Muti’ fled into exile and was – in absence – condemned to a life sentence;
the militants of the organization remaining in Morocco were persecuted.
The majority of the activists founded a new organization, al-Jama’a al-
Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) in 1981 (which became the MUR in 1996). Its
founders Mohamed Yatim, Abdallah Baha, and Abdellilah Benkirane were later
Members of Parliament and members of the General Secretariat of the Party of
Justice and Development. Since the mid-1980s, a reformist vision and a compre-
hensive approach to society emerged and solidified within this organization. Vio-
lence as a means to achieve political goals was explicitly condemned; the political
and religious legitimacy of the monarchic regime was officially accepted; and the
organization adopted internal democratic structures.14
The Moroccan Islamists had thus already reformed their positions regarding
the use of violence and democratic principles before participating in the political
process. Other positions mirror those promoted by many Islamist groups in the
Middle East and North Africa. According to a charter published in the late
1980s, the organization’s goals were to renew the understanding of religion, to
advocate the implementation of shari’a law, to achieve a comprehensive cultural
renaissance, to work on accomplishing the unity of Muslims, to confront ideol-
ogies and ideas which they believed were subversive to Islam, and to raise the edu-
cational and moral level of the Moroccan people. These objectives were to be
attained by individual, public, cultural, social, economic, political, and educational
activities.15
From the 1980s, the organization engaged in a discussion on the desirability
and potential means of political participation. Different options for its implemen-
tation were considered. The preferred one, the creation of its own political party,
was rejected by the authorities in 1992. Instead, the palace tolerated the taking
over of a dormant political party (the Movement Populaire Constitutionnel
De´mocratique – MPCD) by leaders and members of the MUR. This arrangement
was made official in 1996 at an extraordinary party congress of the MPCD, during
which MUR leaders were appointed to the party’s highest body, the General Sec-
retariat. This party was renamed the Party of Justice and Development in 1998.
Initially the party depended strongly on the MUR for human, propaganda, and
infrastructure resources. From the late 1990s onwards, the PJD slowly decreased
its dependency on the MUR. An important precondition was that no formal links
were established between the two organizations: party membership was not made
conditional on MUR membership and no quotas for office were reserved for MUR
members. In the late 1990s, MUR committees debated the question of a total
fusion with the party, but eventually voted against it.16 The MUR’s Shura
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Council then adopted a ‘document of complementarity’ that laid out the intended
division of labour. The PJD was defined as a political organization dealing with all
political issues of the country and defending ‘Islamic causes’ in the institutions,
whereas the MUR was meant to focus on vocation/mission (da’wa) and education.
The two organizations were to be linked by consultation, co-operation, and
co-ordination, and by their joint objectives and principles.17 From then on, their
relation was labelled a ‘partnership’.
The increasing distance between the two organizations materialized particu-
larly along two dimensions: First, the PJD increased its independent mobilization
resources, and, second, it established boundaries in relation to its environment
through the institutionalization of the party organization. Independent mobiliz-
ation resources consisted of financial and human resources, and ancillary organiz-
ations of the party. Financial resources were partly provided by the Moroccan state
through funding of the party’s electoral campaign. However, the party also raised
money through the reallocation of at least 22% of the Members of Parliament’s
(MP) salary (which the party had made mandatory) and membership fees.18
Independent human resources were gained through new party members who
were not affiliated to the MUR. By 2004, the PJD had increased its membership
to between 12,000 and 15,000 members.19 While there is no way to assess directly
the proportion of MURmembers among these, we can infer a trend of a decreasing
proportion of MUR members among PJD members from different types of data.
First, a survey of party congress deputies from 2004 shows that one-third of
them had joined the PJD after 1999.20 Knowing that the majority of MUR
members initially interested in party politics joined the party between 1992 and
1999, we can assume that a large number of the newcomers were not affiliated
to the MUR. Most likely, the proportion of newcomers was actually higher,
since a survey from the party congress tends to be biased towards members
with a higher degree of seniority. Second, by 2002, there was a large proportion
of non-MUR members among the PJD’s local and provincial party leaders, elec-
toral candidates, and MPs. This was shown in the profiles of the PJD’s 179 can-
didates for the 2002 parliamentary elections, published by the MUR’s journal
Al-Tajdid, which listed the candidates’ affiliations with other organizations and
their position in the party. These profiles show that among these candidates,
only one-third of those who were part of the PJD’s ‘intermediate leadership’
(National Council and/or members of the provincial secretariats) and only a
quarter of those holding office in the PJD’s local secretariats were also MUR
members. For the PJD’s candidates and deputies, this trend was even more
marked. Out of the 179 candidates, only 56 were affiliated to the MUR. As for
the MPs, out of the 42 MPs in 2002, only 22 were MURmembers.21 This contrasts
sharply with the profiles of the 14 deputies from 1997, who were all MUR
members except for one. Finally, even some of the party members affiliated
to the MUR may be best considered as PJD human resources. This proves to be
the case, as will be shown below, since such members may shift their loyalty to
the party.
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More independent resources also came from developing parallel structures
to the MUR: a ‘Commission for Women and the Family’ and a youth organization,
the ‘Youth of Justice and Development’. Both of these can be regarded as compet-
ing organizations to the MUR’s (much more powerful) Organization for the
Renewal of the Female Conscience and its Youth committee, respectively. In
contrast, the PJD’s Forum du De´veloppement, founded in 2002, has no MUR
counterpart. It is a forum of cadres who are either members or supporters of the
party. Its tasks are to develop party policies, to support the parliamentary group,
and to give technical and political training to the party’s deputies. These ancillary
organizations are exclusively financed by the party.
By 2002, the PJD’s independent resources for electoral mobilization had
improved considerably in comparison to the 1997 campaign, for which the
party had entirely relied on the MUR. This was even more the case for the elec-
tions in 2003. In the 2003 campaign for the communal elections, the PJD’s
national office aimed to co-ordinate and unify the local campaigns and provided
the local sections with a remarkable amount of independent propaganda resources.
The second crucial step towards autonomy was the institutionalization of the
PJD’s party organization. In a general way, institutionalization implies the estab-
lishment of boundaries vis-a`-vis the environment.22 For a party, these boundaries
are particularly sharpened when rules are formalized and abided by, so that there is
less scope for an informal impact of other organizations on the party. Moreover,
institutionalization implies the strengthening of the role of the party organization
for providing legitimacy to party leaders at all levels of the organizational hierar-
chy and, ultimately, to tie their loyalty and interests to the survival of the party
rather than the movement organization.
In the case of the PJD, the formalization of party rules at all levels was con-
sciously enacted through two revisions of the party’s by-laws in 1999 and 2004.
At the beginning, the competences and prerogatives of different party bodies
were only loosely defined; in practice, electoral candidates were nominated by
the party leadership and the latter was appointed rather than elected. The vague-
ness of the original by-laws – a rather obscure, one-page document – left much
space for informal external influence.23 In contrast, the 2004 by-laws define the
relationship and prerogatives of the different bodies in detail: complicated pro-
cedures apply for choosing the candidates both for parliamentary and local elec-
tions and for party office.
Moreover, a commitment to internal democratic practices, and the respect for
procedures and their transparency enforced the effect of formalization on party
autonomy. This commitment to transparency of procedures and to internal demo-
cratic structures, as part of the party’s message and identity, has been relevant to
the party since the late 1990s. For instance, at the opening session of the 1999 con-
gress, Al-Mukri al-Idrissi Abu Zaid, a member of the General Secretariat, empha-
sized that a political party that did not respect its own rules could not protest
against the state’s lack of rule of law.24 As another party leader put it more
recently, a rule can be more or less good, but the most important thing is that
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the rules for selection are clear and transparent and applied to everybody.25 In the
same fashion, provincial secretaries cite the party rules to defend contested
decisions vis-a`-vis the base, for instance, regarding the selection of electoral can-
didates,26 and party members mention democracy and transparency as a reason for
joining the party.27 Crucially, the very fact that the General Secretariat formalized
an extension of its powers through the 2004 by-laws, instead of keeping the vague-
ness of its prerogatives, shows that ‘democratic legitimacy’ and transparency are
highly valued in the PJD.
The combination of detailed decision-making procedures with the commit-
ment for respecting these procedures worked as strong boundaries vis-a`-vis the
MUR, leaving little space for extra-organizational nominations and decisions.
Indeed, the legitimacy of party leaders and party decisions now has an intra-organ-
izational source. One example is the General Secretariat. Even if all the initial
MUR architects of the political inclusion of the Islamist movement still hold
office in the PJD’s General Secretariat, this is not because they are appointed in
their function as MUR leaders. Their legitimacy now formally emanates from
being elected by the party members in the congress and the National Council,
and party leaders are accountable to party institutions.
These developments may, ultimately, also shift the loyalty of office holders
away from the MUR and towards the party. In the case of the General Secretariat,
interviews revealed that, by 2003, there were essentially three ways in which the
current and former affiliation with the MURwas treated. First, there was a stronger
loyalty to the MUR. Party activities and decisions were based on whether they
were deemed beneficial or not for the MUR.28 A second way of addressing the
issue was a sort of stated separation of loyalties, where the logic of action was
seen as depending on the respective organizational context.29 In this case, it is
not clear what would happen if conflicts arose between these two loyalties.
Finally, in some cases, the commitment to the party clearly took precedence. An
example of this came from a member of the General Secretariat who had given
up his MUR office position. He treated his MUR affiliation as similar to his affilia-
tion with a labour union and his presidency of a study association. In his words, he
was ‘a member of many things’.30
In sum, the PJD has increased its autonomy considerably since its first elec-
toral participation in 1997. This was a consequence of the strengthening of the
party’s independent capabilities for mobilization and of changing the structural
characteristics of the party organization to decrease the informal impact of the
MUR on an initially weak organization which had no clearly defined boundaries.
It is noteworthy that – except for the automatic state funding – all these were
deliberate decisions of the party leadership. This is telling for how the party
viewed itself. Had it been content with simply being the parliamentary branch
of the MUR, there would have been no need for the party to have its own organ-
izations linking it to social groups, no need for independent human resources, nor
to invest so much in the party organization. Initially, this investment in the
party organization is likely to have resulted from the MUR’s illegality as it
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increased the benefits of investing in the legal structures. However, even after the
legalization of the MUR, the PJD’s investment in mobilization capabilities and
party institutionalization continued at the same, if not greater, pace.31
Party autonomy and moderation
The PJD’s gradual autonomy from the MUR facilitated an increasing flexibility of
the party vis-a`-vis their previously shared agenda. Generally, party autonomy
facilitates such flexibility, as no extra-institutional actor can enforce its positions
on the party. As mentioned above, the key difference between party and social
movement organization is that the former operates under the constraints of
formal politics, whereas the latter does not. As long as the movement organization,
as an extra-institutional actor, controls the party, the moderation of the party is
either impossible (in case of total dependency), or too costly from a support
point of view. Thus, moderation is only possible to the extent that the party has
sufficient autonomy or that the movement organization endorses moderation
itself, as a result of other factors.
We operationalize moderation as stemming from institutional constraints by
comparing the attitude of the PJD and of the MUR towards different decisions
of the PJD that involved compromise on the Islamist agenda. Thus, we use the
degree of disagreement/conflict between the two actors as an indicator of the
party’s moderation. In the following, we discuss party decisions and MUR atti-
tudes regarding the support of, or the participation in governance with, left
parties, the rise of technocrats in the party, and the policies implemented by
PJD local councillors to assess the party’s moderation over time.
Indeed, in the early years of the PJD’s parliamentary presence (1997–1999),
when the party was fully dependent on the MUR, no conflicts appear to have
occurred.32 The initial support the PJD lent to the Left-led alternance government
in 1998 was supported by the MUR as a necessity for consolidating former King
Hassan II’s toleration of the Islamists’ electoral participation. Everyone wanted to
show that the Islamists were not a ‘current of refusal’ but a constructive and con-
ciliatory movement that supported the King’s decision to form a consensual
government.33
In 2000, the first problems materialized in the context of this support. The
alternance government aimed to modernize the Moroccan personal status code
(family laws). Supporting the government, the PJD would have had to endorse
a bill that the MUR (in fact, the entire Moroccan Islamist movement) strongly
opposed and had mobilized against since the spring of 2000. The Islamists
mainly opposed the abolition of polygamy and the right of women to arrange
marriages without a ‘marital tutor’; but the protest was also conducted as a
general campaign against the ‘secularist and francophone elites’ and ‘foreign
powers’ which supported the project in order to strip the country of its Islamic
identity and heritage (see also Powell’s article on Tunisia in this special issue).
Moreover, this occurred in the context of another ideological conflict about a
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bill on micro-credits, where the government refused an amendment the PJD
wanted to introduce. This amendment provided the possibility of introducing
Islamic modes of financing, that is loans without interest, alongside conventional
means of financing. From the PJD’s perspective, the Islamist mobilization against
a government it supported posed heavy problems. Eventually, its National Council
voted in favour of going over to the opposition in autumn 2000, thus bringing the
party in line with the Islamist agenda. However, it is noteworthy that the vote
in the National Council was very narrow. The decision against further support
of the government was taken with a difference of only 11 voices out of 280,
showing already a decreasing, ideological rigidity of many representatives of
the intermediate leadership.34
After the 2002 parliamentary elections, the issue of cabinet participation
was again raised. The PJD had increased its seats from 14 to 42 and would
have obtained around six to seven ministries if it had joined government.35 The
MUR’s concern that that the PJD would join an ‘un-Islamic’ government were
publicly expressed by the MUR’s president. About one month after the elections,
while the discussion about the constitution of the government was underway,
Ahmed Raissouni, the MUR’s president from 1998 to 2003, gave an interview
to the PJD’s newspaper Al-’Asr. In this interview, he claimed the PJD’s electoral
success for the MUR, stating that ‘The reputation of the party and its popularity
are the fruit of this movement [the MUR], which directed all its efforts and its
activities towards this party’.36 Additionally, while saying that he did not speak
‘in the name of the party’, Raissouni issued conditions for cabinet participation:
He ‘could not imagine’ that the party would participate in a government that
did not clearly engage itself in respect of the Islamic identity of the country and
the reinforcement of the Arabic language. In particular, he stated that the party
should refuse to participate in a government which rejected the establishment of
zakat (obligatory alms) and loans without interest. In view of the aforementioned
profiles of the PJD’s deputies from 2002, Raissouni’s concerns about the PJD’s
betrayal of the Islamic cause were probably somewhat justified. By linking a
reminder about the PJD’s dependency to advice about acceptable and non-
acceptable conditions of cabinet participation, Raissouni intended to define
thresholds of compromise for the party and to make the party adhere to the
Islamists’ core ideology. The very fact that this reminder had to be made via
public channels, however, also indicated clearly that, by 2002, the MUR was
not able to control the party directly.
That the PJD did not join the cabinet in 2002 was certainly an acknowledge-
ment of the MUR’s threat. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the party had also
strong, non-ideological incentives not to join the cabinet and that those party
leaders and MPs who were against cabinet participation seldom mentioned ideo-
logical reasons for not joining the cabinet. Rather, they feared a decrease in future
electoral strength caused by being part of a government that was unlikely to
improve the socio-economic grievances of those new voters whose support it
had gained in the elections. Along the same lines, party leaders were aware that
Democratization 165
cabinet participation would make it more difficult to maintain its image as non-
corrupt challengers of the Moroccan elite. Therefore, joining government
would have come at the price of losing not only the MUR’s support, but also that
of new sympathizers who had voted for the party in the 2002 elections. Moreover,
just as in 2000, the decision to join the opposition benches was far from being
unanimous among party members and leaders. There were essentially three
reasons given by those wanting to maintain support for the government in 2000
and those wanting to join it in 2002. A first group feared that the PJD would
increase its electoral strength in opposition and, thus, scare the regime. A
second and a third either saw no crucial programmatic differences between the
PJD and the other Moroccan parties’, maintaining that ideological policies were
a luxury that could be promoted once the basic work was done (that is, decrease
poverty, etc.), or wanted to acquire more governmental expertise for the future.37
After the 2003 municipal elections, the PJD changed its attitude towards gov-
ernment. As already mentioned, the PJD had organized its electoral campaign
independently and made use of its own (new) propaganda resources in these elec-
tions. After the elections, the party formed local governmental alliances with all
the existing Moroccan parties. This very pragmatic approach towards local gov-
ernment was the consequence of a clear orientation of the party leadership
towards institutional politics and their appreciation of what this required. Most
importantly, the leadership’s decision was due to its perception that – after the ter-
rorist attacks of 16 May 2003 – the PJD should demonstrate through participation
in government that it was not ‘a party of refusal’.38 At that time, the PJD also tried
to distance itself more clearly from the MUR and denounced MUR leaders for
speaking in the name of the party.39 an obvious hint to MUR leader Ahmad
Raissouni, who had restated his rejection of government participation with the
left and, moreover, questioned the King’s ability to fulfil his role as Commander
of the Faithful.40
A second perspective where we can see how the increasing distance from the
MUR allowed institutional considerations to dominate party decisions, can also be
found in the context of the 2003 communal elections. After 16 May, the power of a
pragmatist, technocratic faction inside the General Secretariat and the National
Council grew considerably. A prominent representative of this faction was a
leading member of the party’s ancillary organization, Forum du De´veloppement.
While a MUR member, he became fully absorbed with institutional considerations
for policy-making: For example, he argued that it was too easy to denounce the
government for privileging the macro-economic equilibrium when this was a con-
straint imposed by international actors. Moreover, he strongly criticized the Isla-
mists’ inclination to populism and unrealistic policy promises for winning ‘the
crowd’s’ support and stressed the necessity of a ‘culture of expertise and of
figures’ and feasible policy propositions that were ‘scientifically valid’.41
Importantly, the increasing power of the technocrats among the leadership
allowed them to implement an idea they had previously pursued unsuccessfully
during the 2002 parliamentary elections: to bring the party’s cadres from the
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back row into the centrality of politics. Technocrats were ‘parachuted’ into elec-
toral lists’ pole positions. From the perspective of the party leaders, the technocrats
were to provide the living evidence of the PJD as a party of serious and concilia-
tory people who knew how to deal with a budget and deliver improvements, and
who could establish good relations with the authorities.
The following example of a PJD vice-mayor illustrates how these experts
approach politics in the framework of local governance. The vice-mayor
pursued concrete projects, the implementation of which he favoured over faithful-
ness to Islamist ideology. Immediately after his appointment, this vice-mayor
drafted a project for social housing to improve the living conditions in the
poorest neighbourhoods. After overcoming the initial suspicion of the mayor
and the governor, his project was set in motion. It was financed through loans with
interest. Acknowledging the contradictions with the Islamist claim against usury –
the very claim that, as shown before, was a no-go for the MUR’s president –
he stated: ‘I don’t even realize, for me that’s fine, this is not really what we are
concerned about.’ Clearly, he accepted this type of financing as a necessary con-
dition, knowing that, otherwise, the project would not materialise at all. In his
words: ‘Now, we realize that it is not enough to have principles to be able to set
up a budget. The citizens judge you on the basis of your efficiency.’42
This is, of course, only one example and not all those elected in the communal
elections have the same profile. However, given the strong intervention of the
General Secretariat in favour of the experts in the communal elections, and the
fact that this faction is now dominating the General Secretariat, we suggest that
this approach reflects a more general trend. Moreover, the increasing involvement
in local governance has also begun to have an impact on those without a techno-
cratic profile. The PJD’s councillors reportedly started to get interested in advice
regarding taxes, budgets, street lighting, waste, etc.43
In summary, as party autonomy grew, the PJD was increasingly capable of
taking independent decisions that revealed a pragmatic attitude towards the
Islamist agenda. Whereas in 2000 and 2002, the MUR’s position won over the
party, this was no longer the case in 2003. Of course, the institutional pressure
on the party increased considerably after the terrorist attacks of May 2003. Never-
theless, autonomy is what enabled the party to respond to this pressure by only
considering its own interests, even dropping key aspects of the Islamist agenda
where necessary. Eventually, the MUR withdrew its support for the PJD, possibly
the strongest indicator of the extent of the PJD’s moderation over the last decade.
Whereas in 2002, the MUR had aimed to bring the PJD in line by threatening to
cut its support, in 2007, the support was actually cut. In the 2007 elections, there
was no campaign on the PJD’s behalf, not even an endorsement to vote for it.44
Islamist moderation and deliberalization
As shown above, the PJD became more and more ideologically flexible during the
last decade. Not fully explicitly but unmistakably, many studies assume that
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Islamist moderation will make democratization in the MENA more likely.
Although the mechanism by which this process is supposed to take place is not
analysed, the assumption appears to be that Islamists’ moderation would deflate
fears of the political elite that Islamists would abuse democratic processes to
install an Islamist dictatorship.45
In contrast, the PJD’s moderation was not followed by a notable increase in
civil and political liberties. On the contrary, since the beginning of the 2000s,
there has been a trend towards reversing earlier political liberalization measures.
This was shown in a more repressive approach, first, towards more critical
social and political actors in general and, second, towards the PJD in particular.
An important symbol of the general trend towards deliberalization was the
reversal of the newly acquired principle of nominating a political prime minister,
that is, the head of the strongest party. Instead, Mohamed VI, who had followed
Hassan II on the throne in 1999, nominated Driss Jettou, the previous minister
of interior without party affiliation. Besides this, human rights abuses increased
and press freedom decreased. For example, a 2004 report by Amnesty Inter-
national highlighted Morocco’s poor record, denouncing a sharp rise in reported
cases of torture or ill-treatment in the context of ‘counter-terrorism’ measures
from 2002.46
As for the PJD, the regime increasingly intervened in party affairs, especially
after 2003. First, the regime tried to neutralize the PJD’s more critical figures,
especially the outspoken head of the PJD’s parliamentary group and member of
the General Secretariat, Mustapha Ramid. In July 2003, Ramid had already
offered his resignation in protest against the ‘anti-democratic ways in which the
party was treated and the odious instrumentalization of the May 16th attacks’.47
At that time, the party leadership refused to accept his resignation. However, in
October 2003, the minister of interior increased the pressure and Mustapha
Ramid eventually had to resign as head of the parliamentary group.48 In the
same vein, it was made clear to the leadership that Ramid must not become
the party’s Secretary General.49 Second, the PJD was forced to reduce its coverage
of electoral constituencies in an unprecedented way in 2003. Originally, the PJD
had intended to cover around 50%, just as in the 2002 parliamentary elections.
In the 2003 elections, however, after some ‘negotiations with the ministry of
interior’50 the party was only allowed to contest around 18% of the contested
seats. Moreover, a system of partial coverage was enacted. That is, in big cities,
the constituencies were covered in such a way that the party could not win a
majority of the seats, i.e. the presidency, in any city. Although the PJD could
cover all constituencies in the 2007 parliamentary elections, strong gerrymander-
ing and a new electoral law guaranteed that, while the PJD won most votes, it
gained five seats less than the winning Istiqlal party.
Why did the regime repress an ever more moderate PJD? An important factor
was certainly the increase in the PJD’s strength. Since its first electoral partici-
pation in 1997, the PJD had increased its electoral support from 14 to 42 seats
in 2002. Although in 2007 the PJD ultimately only gained an additional five
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seats, it was widely believed before the elections that it would gain up to 40% of
the vote.51 In Morocco, where governments are typically composed of around five
parties that fight over resources and ultimately resort to the King for arbitration,
gaining 40% of the votes might have allowed the PJD to lead a small government
coalition and to assert the prerogatives of party government, parliament, and pol-
itical parties vis-a`-vis the monarchy. If an elected government is assertive and
defends its prerogatives, it is uncomfortable for the regime, irrespective of the pol-
icies pursued by any particular party. However moderate the PJD might have been
in office, for the regime, a party with such strength would have hampered the
pursuit of divide-and-rule politics, an important pillar of regime stability in
Morocco. Even if – in contrast to the MENA republics – the electoral landslide
of an oppositional party is not an immediate threat to regime survival, an important
pillar of rule in MENA monarchies is precisely the division and fragmentation of
political forces, which facilitate the control and manipulation of the opposition and
allow the monarch to act as the supreme arbitrator of politics.52 The supremacy of
the monarchy in the political game is thus based on the absence of a united oppo-
sition or one particularly strong oppositional actor. Moreover, the very fact that the
Moroccan king has kept such tight control in the past over who would be allowed
representation in the institutions (and in what proportion) demonstrates a strong
concern about the balance inside these institutions.
In sum, any possible effect of the PJD’s moderation on democratization was
cancelled out by its increase in strength that was threatening the regime (for this
point, see also Cavatorta’s contribution in this issue).
The EU and the promotion of Islamist moderation
The promotion of democracy is a stated goal of the EU’s external policies in
general, and of the Barcelona process in particular.53 Although the EU has yet
to develop a systematic approach towards Islamist parties, in view of European
concerns about terrorism and radicalization, it is logical to assume that Islamist
moderation and inclusion in the political process ought to be an EU goal as
well. Moreover, an – admittedly awkward – illustration of the goal of moderation
is the EU’s stance towards the electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006 (see also
Hovdenak’s and Pace’s contributions in this special issue on Hamas and EU
democracy promotion). The three conditions that the EU, alongside the govern-
ment of the USA and the United Nations (UN), established for recognizing the
Hamas government (recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and accep-
tance of existing peace accords) can be understood as an – unsuccessful –
attempt to force moderation.
Besides showing that the EU indeed needs a policy towards Islamist political
parties, an important lesson of this failed policy towards Hamas is that Islamist
moderation cannot be mandated by an external actor. This applies particularly
to actors such as the Islamists, who derive part of their legitimacy from their auton-
omy from Western influence. Thus, the EU, as an external actor, can be thought to
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have relatively little, direct influence over moderation processes and should seek
to influence such processes indirectly.
Our case study suggests that one way of doing so could be through the pro-
vision of resources to Islamist political parties. A key implication of the Moroccan
case is that an increasing pragmatism of Islamist parties can result from an increase
in party autonomy from the Islamist movement and that this autonomy was fos-
tered by the party’s accumulation of its own resources. Drawing on the findings
of the Moroccan case study one could speculate that external actors could contrib-
ute to these processes by providing resources to the party, for instance, by offering
technical training to MPs and party members, improving their campaigning skills
or, more generally, by publicly considering them as part of the legitimate
opposition.
Whether the EU would see this channelling of resources to Islamist parties
as beneficial or not is likely to depend on how moderate the party already
is. The EU would probably not wish to empower a party if it considers it
‘radical’ in the first instance. If, conversely, the party is already moderate,
empowering it would seem to be in the EU’s interests, in the same way that
it would typically seek to strengthen civil society actors in authoritarian
regimes countries.54
This could be done by emulating the example of the United States. The US
government-funded National Democratic Institute, for instance, provides training
for Moroccan parties – including the PJD. Such a policy should be complemen-
ted by pressures for political liberalization to ensure that the regime does
not respond to the Islamists’ increasing strength with repression. Particular atten-
tion should be paid to preventing the party from being banned, as this would, at
the very least, neutralize the gains of moderation. For the EU, including the PJD
in civil society forums in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP), would officially recognize the party as a legitimate actor, thereby
working as a shield against repression, and making it more difficult for the
party to be banned.
Current EU policy towards Morocco shows a different picture. EU policy
towards the Islamists – to the extent that it exists – is one of avoidance. Islamists
have never benefited from funding in the framework of the EMP. In view of the
PJD’s legality, this would, however, be possible. Moreover, the agenda of the
PJD is to some extent close to the EU’s in that it promotes transparency, aims
at upgrading representative institutions, and even promotes women in public
and party office more energetically than the majority of the other Moroccan
parties. However, the consensus among EU policy-makers appears to be to
avoid the Islamist issue for as long as possible. In contrast, the EU strongly sup-
ports the Moroccan regime with material and legitimacy resources. To date,
Morocco is one of the main benefactors among southern countries of the
EMP.55 As to legitimacy resources, the EU provides them, for instance, with
praise for the Moroccan ‘democratisation process [and] transparent and demo-
cratic general elections’ at a time when NGOs report deliberalization.56 Similarly,
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the renewed praise for the 2007 elections as ‘democratic, transparent, and fair’ by
the EU and its member states stands in sharp contrast to an actual turnout of 37%,
and an electoral law designed to ensure the supremacy of the monarchy in the
political process.
Concluding remarks
This article has focused on only one particular channel for moderation –
autonomy – which is surely not the only relevant one. However, as our case
study showed, this channel can be important and its implications are undoubtedly
worth considering seriously. These implications will obviously apply best for the
Moroccan case. Nevertheless, we believe that the channel uncovered is of some
generality and could potentially apply to other places as well. In that case, of
course, the particular context needs to be taken into account.
There are important cases (for instance, Egypt) where the regimes refuse to lega-
lize an Islamist political party and Islamists, thus, contest elections as independent
candidates. In such cases, obviously our suggested path to moderation could not
be set in motion. Those representing the party inside the political institutions will
always be fully subject to the decisions of external leaders. In such cases, the EU’s
efforts could then be directed towards pressurising the regime for party legalization.
Party legalization may not in all cases lead to party autonomy as smoothly as
was the case with the PJD. For instance, our research suggests that all the crucial
decisions of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) are, 15 years after its foun-
dation, in reality taken by the Muslim Brotherhood. In this case, however, the
social movement organization formalized its control over the party through a
document that obliges IAF members who are members of the Muslim Brotherhood
to vote for decisions previously taken by the IAF’s Shura Council.57 Nevertheless,
a faction inside the IAF is currently striving for more autonomy, namely through
the recruitment of new members who are not affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood.
In some situations, therefore, certain conditions may make the evolution towards
autonomy slower or more difficult, relative to the Moroccan case.
Finally, our article shows that moderation does not automatically lead to a
greater willingness of ruling elites to democratize. Indeed, an ideologically flexible
opposition is not enough to induce autocrats to democratize. Nancy Bermeo shows
that moderation is not a necessary condition for democratization.58 Our case study
shows that it is not sufficient either. For the EU, this implies that if moderation and
democratization are relevant goals in the MENA region, each will have to be pro-
moted for its own sake.
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